Atrocities Watch Africa: February Atrocity-Risk Monitor

Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) is a non-partisan civil society organisation that provides continental leadership in matters pertaining to the prevention of mass atrocities within Africa. This newsletter builds on our team’s continuous monitoring of the continent to identify deteriorating situations where atrocities may be committed and track ongoing situations of atrocities to understand where they may deteriorate further or where there may be opportunities for improvement.

This month’s newsletter covers: 

• Increased risk to civilians in Mozambique amid increased economic activity in Cabo Delgado.

• The escalating Islamist armed group activity in Niger. 

• Increased risk of return to full scale civil war in South Sudan.

Read the full report here

Mozambique: Increased Risk to Civilians Amid Increased Economic Activity in Cabo Delgado

Summary: Mozambique’s northern insurgency continues as a major gas project restarts in Cabo Delgado. Violence is spreading into new areas, displacing civilians. Clashes between Islamist armed groups and security forces continue raising concerns about prolonged instability and civilian harm.

Despite reduced intensity during the 2025-2026 rainy season, northern Mozambique continued to experience ongoing insecurity driven by the long-running Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado.  Clashes between Islamic State Mozambique (ISM) and the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) continued, particularly in Macomia district. 

At the same time, the conflict is slowly spreading into Nampula province, affecting communities that were previously considered relatively safe and hosted displaced persons. This escalation led to the displacement of nearly 100,000 people in late November alone. Many of those affected had already been displaced multiple times. UNHCR has warned that humanitarian needs are increasing and assistance capacity is not able to keep up.

In the second half of 2025, more RDF troops were deployed to Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, and Muidumbe districts, likely linked to the restart of TotalEnergies’ gas project in Palma. The project, which involves building a liquefied natural gas plant, had been suspended since 2021 after a jihadist attack on Palma killed an estimated 800 people and forced tens of thousands to flee. The project is central to Mozambique’s economy and a priority for the government, making the area strategically important. Increased security operations and militarisation may put civilians at risk. 

Over the past eight years, the government’s response to the insurgency has been primarily a military one, including national forces, private security actors, and foreign troops. However, the insurgency has not been contained mostly because this approach fails to address long-standing local grievances, including unequal access to the benefits of resource exploitation. These ethnic and identity tensions have further been exploited by ISM which has used it to recruit the local population. 

Without a broader strategy that addresses these underlying drivers, the conflict risks becoming increasingly protracted and continuing to spread. The combination of renewed economic activity in the region and the ongoing adaptable insurgency increases the risk of continued civilian harm and instability.

Niger: Escalating Islamist Activity

Summary: The security situation in Niger is deteriorating mostly due to the activity of armed Islamist groups and a shrinking civic space since the 2023 military coup. Violence is concentrated in the Tillabéry region, now the deadliest area in the central Sahel. 

Niger’s location in the central Sahel and its shared borders with Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Benin have created several borderland areas where militant activity across countries is high and while the country has not yet experienced violence on the scales of Mali and Burkina Faso, recent trends suggest that the situation is worsening, particularly for civilians. The Tillabéry region which borders Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali is at the intersection of multiple conflict zones allowing for cross-border mobility and is a point for expansion southwards. Tillabéry has become the epicentre of violence and is now the deadliest area across the central Sahel where more than 1,200 people were killed in 2025. Violence has been widespread across multiple departments, with civilians disproportionately targeted. Civilian harm has resulted not only from jihadist violence but also from state operations; on 6 January 2026, a military drone hit a crowded market killing at least 17 civilians, including four children, and three islamist fighters, raising concerns about indiscriminate attacks and potential violations of international Humanitarian Law. Attacks are primarily attributed to the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), followed by Nigerien security forces and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). The emergence of local militias in the area further complicate the situation, increasing the risk of reprisals, abuses, and violence against communities perceived as aligned with rival actors. 

Militant activity is spreading into areas previously considered less affected with armed groups having been expanding operations into northern Agadez in central Niger and southern Dosso near the Niger–Nigeria–Benin-Burkina Faso border area, where they have been present since 2024. In rural parts these groups contest government control, impose their own rules and tax communities. Simultaneously, inter-communal violence involving ethnic militias and community-based self-defence groups drive reprisal attacks and abuses. In 2025, civilians have increasingly been targeted and atrocities were committed against communities near the Niger-Nigeria border and a US citizen was kidnapped in the capital city Niamey in October. Militants also targetedeconomic infrastructure such as the Benin–Niger oil pipeline.

On the political front, the military authorities adopted a decree calling for “general mobilisation” against armed groups in December 2025, allowing them power to call on civilians, seize goods, limit movement and communication, and require people to report suspicious activities. The measure was presented as necessary to address the security crisis, however, rights groups such as Human Rights Watch have criticised the broad nature of the text as it could be used to silence dissent and further restrict freedoms in a country already under military rule.

The situation in Niger is worrisome, civilians are being targeted, local militias are forming, and the state is losing control of parts of its territory increasing the risk of mass atrocities and underscoring the need for independent and transparent investigations into alleged violations, including those involving state security forces, a concern also raised by Human Rights Watch.

International Response: 

Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, under the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) met in Bamako in December 2025 and announced the creation of a joint military battalion. The meeting focused on defence and security, development, communication, and counterterrorism.

ECOWAS confirmed that the three AES countries would continue to participate as non-regional members in the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development and the regional anti–money laundering body. 

South Sudan: Increased Risk of Return to Full Scale War

Summary: South Sudan is sliding back into full scale armed conflict and the risk of mass atrocities is high. Fighting is intensifying in Jonglei and Upper Nile where  opposition forces and ethnically aligned militias clash with government troops. The rapid escalation of violence, increase in hate speech and incitement to violence by authorities, is particularly dangerous in South Sudan’s fragile post-war environment. 

Fighting has intensified in South Sudan, particularly in Jonglei and Upper Nile states, which host large Nuer communities who are mostly opposed to President Salva Kiir. Since December 2025, opposition forces have been making territorial gains and launched attacks on government positions. These forces are heterogeneous, some are loyal to opposition leader Riek Machar and others are part of the White Army, an ethnically Nuer militia that operates independently but has fought alongside Machar’s forces in the past. Other armed groups and local commanders, some of whom previously broke away from Machar, are also involved. 

The government responded by launching a large military operation aimed at retaking lost territory and “re-establishing law and order,” ordering civilians to evacuate multiple counties. The scale and speed of mobilisation on both sides suggest the conflict is entering a dangerous new phase. In a country shaped by a recent civil war and deep ethnic divisions, these developments create fertile conditions for mass atrocities. The deployments were accompanied by an alarming rise in hate speech and incitement to violence. In one instance, General Johnson Olony was recorded urging his troops to “not spare anyone or anything”. Olony commands a Shilluk militia that was integrated into the national army, and his deployment to Nuer areas is particularly concerninggiven past Shilluk–Nuer clashes. The increase in violence as well as the hateful discourse raise fears of ethnic targeting and mass violence. The UN Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan warned that in the country’s past, similar dynamics preceded mass atrocities, and that such rhetoric, when issued by those in positions of command, implies permission to commit violence.

The renewed conflict has worsened an already complex humanitarian situation. Since late December, more than 230,000 people have left Jonglei State, many of whom had already been displaced multiple times by prior violence, flooding, and food insecurity. Health facilities and other infrastructure have been damaged or destroyed and looting of humanitarian aid by both parties has forced the suspension of essential services. All of this is happening amid chronic underfunding, making it harder to deliver aid.

The renewed fighting is taking place amid a deep political crisis and the collapse of the 2018 peace agreement. The arrest of opposition leader and First Vice President Riek Machar has split the opposition, with some groups resorting to fighting and others working with the government. At the same time, the ruling party has been shaken by repeated leadership changes and internal divisions. These developments have left both political leaders weaker than they were during the last civil war with their political institutions and command structures under strain.

These developments should be understood not as an isolated escalation, but as the latest stage in a prolonged deterioration of the country’s political and security environment. This has been caused by years of stalled implementation and violations of the 2018 peace agreement, including the chronic postponement of national elections, a shrinking political space, and sustained violations of ceasefire. 

The situation has now worsened further with direct fighting increasing, armed groups mobilising, and hate speech resurfacing among those in positions of power. Together these developments are creating conditions in which mass violence against civilians could unfold. In a country with South Sudan’s recent history, where similar warning signs have preceded atrocities in the past, the risk is very much real. 

The International Crisis Group identified two main consequences. First, both sides are mobilising support along ethnic lines, deepening divisions (particularly between Dinka and Nuer communities), increasing the risk of retaliatory violence. Second, the conflict risks involving neighbouring countries. Kiir already relies on support from Uganda, on the other hand, the opposition’s recent gains fuelled suspicions of backing from the Sudanese Armed Forces or its foreign allies, while allegations of deepening RSF ties have taken hold, particularly in line with their apparent collaboration in the Heglig oil fields

International Response: 

International and regional actors have expressed growing concern over the situation in South Sudan. The Troika (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway) described the spread of fighting as a major setback and called on South Sudanese leaders to halt armed attacks and return to dialogue. These messages were amplifiedby multiple diplomatic missions and the European Union.

The African Union, through its Peace and Security Council, has reiterated the importance of implementing the 2018 peace agreement and continuing preparations for the 2026 elections. The AU High-Level Ad Hoc Committee for South Sudan delegation visited Juba to raise concerns about the political situation, the stalled peace process, and election preparations.The UN Security Council held closed consultations on South Sudan at the request of the United States, focusing on political developments and the increasingly tense relations between the government and UNMISS.

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