November Atrocity-Risk Monitor

At Atrocities Watch Africa (AWA) we work to prevent and respond to mass atrocities across the continent through early warning, advocacy, and sustained engagement. This newsletter draws on our team’s continuous monitoring to highlight emerging and ongoing crises, identify rising risks, and point to opportunities for action.In this edition, we focus on key developments in:

• Cameroon where post-election unrest continues amid low voter turnout, contested results, and the ongoing Anglophone conflict.

• The Democratic Republic of the Congo where despite progress on paper, fighting continues in the east, with M23, FARDC, and allied militias carrying out widespread atrocities. 

  
  

• Mali where the siege in Bamako and surrounding areas has disrupted daily life, with civilians facing increasing insecurity. 

• Sudan where mass atrocities are ongoing in El Fasher, and the Kordofan region faces a similar risk if the situation is not urgently addressed. 

Read the full report here. 

Cameroon

Cameroon’s 12 October election gave President Paul Biya another term amid low turnout, claims of fraud, and a crackdown on protests. Opposition groups rejected the results, and ongoing Anglophone conflict and Boko Haram attacks make the situation even more unstable.

Cameroon held elections on 12 October, and Paul Biya was declared winner for an eighth term after more than four decades in power. The results were released after weeks of heightened tensions and ongoing claims of fraud. 

Both Biya and opposition leader Tchiroma Bakary had declared themselves winners before the Constitutional Council released its official report in favor of Biya. Protests in defense of Tchiroma took place prior to the official announcement of the results in several cities throughout the country, defying an ongoing ban on protests imposed by the ruling party. Security forces clamped down and four people had been killed and 30 arrested in Douala by late October.

Some opposition leaders were arrested for allegedly plotting attacks against the government. The African Movement for New Independence and Democracy political party claimed their members were being kidnapped by security forces in an effort to intimidate others. 

In order to increase their chances of ousting Biya, over two dozen opposition parties backed Tchiroma Bakary as their consensus candidate under the Union for Change 2025 coalition. However, only 43% of the population went to the polls, with widespread abstention in the north and south west regions as separatists barred the Anglophone population from participating. According to official results, Biya obtained over 53% of the votes.  

The situation remains uncertain, but the disputed election results and the deaths of protesters could lead to further unrest. Tchiroma condemned the killing of the protesters, paying tribute to those who died “at the hands of a regime that has become criminal during a peaceful march.” He urged Biya’s government to end the violence and arbitrary arrests, and called for transparency in the vote count, warning that otherwise, additional peaceful demonstrations would follow. Tensions had already been stirring prior to election day with opposition parties sounding the alarm over ongoing oppression and risk of fraud. Maurice Kamto, the main challenger in 2018 whose protests sparked a post-election crisis, was barred from running this year, undermining the credibility of the vote. Peaceful protests took place in Yaoundé where security forces dispersed demonstrators with tear gas. In early August, at least 35 supporters, including seven women, were detained on charges such as public disorder and rebellion. Lawyers argue the arrests were politically motivated.

President Biya has maintained power in Cameroon through elite co-optation, repression, and divide-and-rule tactics that have fragmented the political landscape. While the country formally allows multiparty politics, real competition is non-existent. The electoral commission (ELECAM) is dominated by Biya loyalists, the judiciary and legislature largely serve executive interests, and state-controlled media and restrictions on press freedom silence dissent. Biya’s declining health and long absences from the public eye have heightened succession anxiety within the ruling party. The constitutional successor, Senate President Marcel Niat Njifenji, is nearing 90, raising fears of a governance vacuum in the event of Biya’s death or resignation. On 19 August, opposition candidate Akere Muna petitioned the Constitutional Council to disqualify Biya from the race, arguing that the constitution bars candidates dependent on others. However, the Council rejected the petition.

Civic space had also been shrinking ahead of the elections. Authorities banned several gatherings, security forces even interrupted a live TV interview with a political figure, while opposition candidates and supporters reported intimidation and threats. 

The lack of transparency in the elections, the arrest of key opposition figures, and the suppression of protests, combined with pre-existing conflicts raise the risk of violence. The election crisis complicates an already fragile security situation in Cameroon which is facing both an Anglophone armed resistance and intermittent Boko Haram activity. As noted above, this insecurity limited turnout in some areas. The International Crisis Group warned that the ongoing instability would complicate voter turnout, particularly in rural areas and conflict zones. Ambazonia separatist leaders rejected Biya’s candidacy, declaring voting “outlawed”and preventing voters from participating. They rejected opposition francophone requests to mobilise the vote against Biya, instead demanding prisoner releases, a ceasefire, and talks with the government as preconditions for participation.

Jihadist violence has also continued to target civilians. Boko Haram is increasingly turning to kidnappings for ransom, with civilian attacks in Cameroon’s Far North region more than doubling last month. On 14 August, insurgents abducted around 50 passengers from a bus in Diamaré, releasing most after ransoms were paid. The surge comes as Nigerian military offensives push fighters into Cameroon, where attacks expanded in Mayo-Moskota and spiked in Kolofata, a long-time hotspot for cross-border violence and livestock theft. Both Boko Haram and ISWAP exploit porous borders to evade security forces, but strained cooperation within the Multinational Joint Task Force (following Niger’s withdrawal and Chad’s threats to leave) has weakened regional counterinsurgency efforts.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Despite progress on paper, fighting continues in eastern Congo, with M23, FARDC, and allied militias carrying out widespread atrocities. Political agreements and negotiations have so far failed to provide real protection on the ground.

In June, a US-brokered peace agreement between the DRC and Rwanda was touted as an opening for peace. However, that peace agreement left many gaps, not least that the Congolese rebels that have been at the core of most of the fighting were not at the table, although they later negotiated separately with the government. Relations between the DRC and Rwanda remain tense, despite having met several times to implement the deal, they continue to exchange accusations. Main difficulties in advancing the agreement include efforts to neutralise the FDLR and for Rwanda to lift its defensive measures. 

In July, the DRC and the March 23 Mouvement (M23) signed a Declaration of Principles in Doha aimed at ending the fighting, followed by a Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed mid-November. The Framework aims to address the root causes of the conflict and to serve as a roadmap to stop the fighting, it includes eight implementation protocols, two of which have already been signed, including one on ceasefire monitoring and another on prisoner exchange. Despite these significant developments in the political arena, violence on the ground has not significantly changed with fighting continuing among the warring parties.

The NGO Security Council Report indicated that the UN sees a potential role for MONUSCO in supporting mediation and supervising a ceasefire, though the 27 June DRC–Rwanda peace agreement, however the mission is experiencing funding issues and the agreement as signed did not explicitly assign the mission a role.  Simultaneously, a parallel African-led process under the EAC and SADC is seeking to consolidate and harmonise its efforts with US and Qatari mediation.

Despite progress in mediation efforts, the security situation has worsened in recent months. Since capturing large parts of North and South Kivu, M23 has increasingly targeted civilians as part of efforts to consolidate its control over the territory. In July, Human Rights Watch reported that the group summarily executed over 140 in at least 14 villages near FDLR strongholds and around Virunga National Park. OCHA reported at least 319 killings between 9 and 21 July in four villages of Rutshuru. The killings continued in August when at least 41 people were executed in the Binza area between 30 July and 8 August. Those targeted appear to be largely ethnic Hutu populations and, to a lesser degree, Nande, who are viewed as aligned with the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). The UN said Rwandan forces were involved, though Rwanda denied this.

The OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission’s (FFM) launched its report which concluded that all parties to the conflict committed serious human rights violations between January and July 2025. The FFM determined that M23 received training, material, intelligence and operational support from the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF), a connection long reported but denied by the Rwandan government. The FFM has found both RDF and M23 responsible for violations which may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, while the Congolese army (FARDC) and allied Wazalendo militias may have committed war crimes. The conflict was found to involve both non-international armed conflicts and an international armed conflict between the DRC and Rwanda.

The FFM found that the M23 engaged in an organised campaign of intimidation and violent repression through a recurrent pattern of abuses against anyone perceived as opposing the group. This included carrying out massacres of hundreds of mostly Hutu civilians, including infants, often using machetes and axes, during offensives in Rutshuru. They detained thousands of civilians, including patients and medical staff, in overcrowded and unsanitary sites where torture was systematic. Civilians were stripped of Congolese IDs, branded as “Rwandans,” and forcibly deported. Reports also detailed widespread sexual violence, including rape and gang rape of women, men, children, and LGBT people in homes and improvised detention sites. Meanwhile, FARDC and Wazalendo were implicated in over 1,000 cases of sexual violence in South Kivu alone, retaliatory executions of civilians, looting, and child recruitment. Wazalendo militias established illegal detention centers, carried out torture, extorted civilians through discriminatory taxation, and incited killings of Tutsi and Banyamulenge through hate speech. The report held the DRC responsible for violations by its army and proxy groups, and Rwanda responsible for abuses committed by RDF and M23.

With FARDC forces focused on combating the M23 insurgency, other armed groups have exploited the security vacuum, most notably the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The group has intensified its campaign of violence in recent months, killing more than 150 civilians between July and August alone. In early September, the ADF massacred 72 people in Ntoyo, North Kivu, followed just days later by another attack near Beni that left around 50 dead.

Tensions in South Kivu are also increasing, especially around Uvira. In South Kivu fighting broke out between Burundi’s army and the RED Tabara, a Burundian rebel group active in eastern Congo. A new armed group, the Front Burundais de Libération, has made the situation even more complicated. If this persists it risks further damaging the already complex relations between Rwanda and neighbouring Burundi. 

In addition, tensions between Tshisekedi and former president Kabila have been on the rise in recent months, as Tshisekedi has consistently accused Kabila of supporting M23. Kabila was sentenced to death in absentia by a military court for treason, participation in an insurrectionist movement, rape, and torture. Kabila, had recently become more vocal. After years in exile he visited M23-held Goma in May, increasing tensions. Kabila’s supporters view this sentencing as a political move to weaken the opposition and fear this sentence risks derailing the ongoing peace efforts. 

Tshisekedi also announced a cabinet reshuffle, appointing two opposition figures to senior posts in an apparent effort to broaden his political base and strengthen consensus ahead of the 2028 presidential elections. However, the move fell short of public expectations for a true government of national unity, as prominent opposition leaders and parties were excluded. While many in the opposition back an inclusive national dialogue spearheaded by Congolese churches, the government has so far resisted this initiative. 

Despite international calls for peace and ongoing negotiations, civilians in eastern Congo continue to face extreme violence. The situations described above reveal ongoing patterns of grave abuse and ethnic cleansing, particularly the targeting of Hutu communities in what appears to be an ongoing campaign against FDLR, and M23’s consolidation in North and South Kivu. Political agreements have yet to translate into protection on the ground, highlighting the urgent need for accountability and adherence to international law. Rwanda should end all support to M23, withdraw its forces and the DRC must cease collaboration with militias. Both governments and allied armed groups must uphold international law, and allow for credible and impartial investigations to hold perpetrators accountable. The international community must intensify pressure on both governments to limit the violence and push for genuine peace efforts.

International response:

The United States (US) sought the implementation of the Regional Economic Integration Framework (REIF) which outlines cooperation between the DRC and Rwanda on energy, infrastructure, and mining. However the DRC declined to sign a document aimed at advancing the REIF stating lack of progress in the US-brokered agreement.  

The UN Stabilisation Mission (MONUSCO) briefed the Security Council with participation of DRC and Rwanda representatives. Focus was placed on the increasing challenges facing MONUSCO which has struggled with operational restrictions, including limits on freedom of movement, fuel shortages that nearly forced it to scale back personnel and operations, and the inability of troop-contributing countries to rotate forces. These difficulties, compounded by M23’s territorial gains and control of Goma, raised questions about MONUSCO’s effectiveness and future role, which is likely to be central to upcoming mandate renewal discussions in December. MONUSCO’s challenges are worsened by UN funding cuts from, it is expected that in a worst-case scenario, the mission could face drastic reductions in personnel and operational capabilities.

The three independent members of the recently established Independent Commission of Inquiry on the human rights situation in South and North Kivu were named. The Commission was established in February 2025 with a mandate to investigate and establish the root causes of the violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and identify those responsible.

At the UN General Assembly, Tshisekedi accused Rwanda of obstructing peace efforts and supporting M23, demanding the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from Congolese territory. On the other hand, Rwanda’s Foreign Minister accused the DRC of militarisation and collaboration with “genocidal and sanctioned armed groups,” including the FDLR and Wazalendo militias.

The UN Human Rights Council was briefed on the OHCHR Fact-Finding Mission’s (FFM) report abovementioned. The report covers developments in North and South Kivu between January and July 2025. The FFM concluded that all parties to the conflict committed serious human rights violations. 

Mali

JNIM has besieged Bamako, disrupting fuel supplies, kidnapping foreigners, and forcing schools and businesses to close. While the group likely cannot fully capture the capital, it is exposing the government’s weaknesses and putting it under pressure. There is an urgent need for dialogue, regional cooperation, and solutions that go beyond military action.

Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has been conducting a months-long siege of Bamako, the capital, blocking major fuel supply routes and attacking convoys. Foreigners have been kidnapped and businesses and schools were forced to shut down. This marks a turning point in the ongoing war between the country’s military government and the jihadist forces. 

The disruption has also impacted several secondary cities. While jihadist groups do not control major roads, they retain the capacity to launch attacks across key routes. The army, alongside Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group) have launched operations focusing on securing supply lines through Ivory Coast, but progress has been limited, and fuel shortages persist.

The group began blocking oil tankers bound for Bamako in September, some believe as a response to the military government’s 1 July ban on small-scale fuel sales in rural areas, a measure aimed to disrupt JNIM’s supply networks and restrict its mobility within areas under its control. Others, however, believe that it is part of a robust plan that has been months if not years in the making. 

Total control of the city is currently not the most likely scenario. The International Crisis Group suggests the group may aim to divert government attention and resources toward the capital, thereby consolidating control over rural areas where it already operates. With the group trying to consolidate its power in southern Mali, the siege also demonstrates its influence and capacity. The current situation places increasing pressure on the military government to negotiate, something the government has, so far, refused to do. Ulf Laessing of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, argues that JNIM likely lacks the military strength to capture well-defended urban centers and would struggle to gain support among city residents, whose grievances differ from those in rural areas.

Public frustration in Bamako is growing and residents are urging the government to take action. The narrative around Mali’s ability to contain the threat and the regime’s overall capacity has weakened. Local agreements have reportedly been previously reached in several towns across the Segou, Mopti, and Timbuktu regions, under which JNIM agreed to lift its sieges in exchange for community compliance with its rules, taxation, and a commitment not to cooperate with the military.

So, why is the army unable to address the situation? Oluwole Ojewale from the Institute for Security Studies believes this is because while the armed forces are organised for conventional warfare, they are facing a conflict that demands flexibility, intelligence, and rapid response. Mali’s military capabilities are limited and difficult to strengthen under current sanctions and ongoing international isolation. In contrast, JNIM operates through mobility and decentralisation, it is able to strike quickly and withdraw into difficult terrain before state forces can respond.

JNIM, al-Qaeda’s Sahel affiliate, is the region’s most active armed group. Its primary objectives are to expand territorial control and eliminate Western influence within its areas of operation. The group may ultimately seek to seize major cities in order to assert national authority and position itself as a governing power in Mali.

Following the 2021 coup that brought Assimi Goita to power, the African Union suspended Mali. Since then, the military-led governments of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have withdrawn from ECOWAS, cut ties with Western partners, and increasingly aligned themselves with Russia for military support. There is an urgent need for course correction, including opening dialogue and restoring ties with neighboring countries. The current situation may also be leveraged by parties which may try to regain power, this could face pushback from military leaders who feel threatened.

Throughout the region, counterinsurgency efforts rely heavily on military action without addressing the underlying socioeconomic and governance issues that fuel insurgencies. Issues like corruption, inequality, and marginalisation mean military campaigns often contain but don’t solve the conflict.

Sudan 

El Fasher has fallen to the RSF, who are committing horrific atrocities against civilians trapped in the city. Meanwhile, intense fighting is underway in the Kordofan region. RSF, allied with SPLM-N, is fighting SAF for control of El-Obeid, while Dilling and Kadugli in South Kordofan face similar sieges and humanitarian crises. The atrocities seen in El Fasher raise serious concerns that such violence could spread to these cities. Violence expected to escalate during the dry season, urgent international action is needed to protect civilians.

El Fasher fell to the Rapid Support Forces on October 26 after an 18 month siege. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) announced their withdrawal from the city a day prior, arguing that this would avoid further destruction and civilian casualties. 

The former Janjaweed militia, now operating as the RSF, appears to be completing the cycle of atrocities that began two decades ago. Reports of ethnically motivated mass atrocities, including summary executions of civilians attempting to escape the city, killings and mass detention of humanitarian volunteers and journalists, attacks on hospitals and summary executions were among the violations reported. In one particularly horrific incident, an estimated 460 people were killed at the Saudi Maternity Hospital on October 30. Sexual violence against women and girls is suspected to be extremely high. Tens of thousands of civilians, including many children, are trapped with severe malnutrition and scarce food. Aid convoys are rarely able to reach the region due to ongoing violence, road closures, and attacks, leaving civilians cut off from essential supplies. The Yale Humanitarian Law, using satellite imagery, has reported that it seems that the RSF is engaging in the mass disposal of human remains. 

These violations were not unforeseen. Indeed, civil society has been warning about the risk of these atrocities for more than a year. Atrocities currently under investigation by the International Criminal Court were committed under similar circumstances when El Geneina fell in June 2023. 

El Fasher had been under siege since April 2024.The situation had been escalating for the past several months. By the end of September Abu Shouk IDP camp was already under de facto RSF control. In August, reported civilian deaths from targeted attacks had already risen by over 50%. 

During the siege, Non-Arab communities were deliberately targeted, civilian infrastructure – including the last remaining functioning hospital – and displacement camps were destroyed, and critical supply routes blocked. Attacks on surrounding areas continued to escalate, raising urgent warnings of ethnic cleansing. Médecins Sans Frontières reported in April 2025 that RSF fighters openly discussed plans to “clean” the city of non-Arab residents, particularly the Zaghawa community. 

In recent weeks, the conflict has shifted toward the Kordofan region, mirroring the intensity and humanitarian impact seen in North Darfur as RSF and SAF fought for control. Civilians were targeted throughout. The RSF is fighting in kordofan in alliancewith the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu. The two groups joined forces in February against SAF. SAF holds the strategic city of El-Obeid in North Kordofan, which is currently under RSF siege. Maintaining control of El-Obeid is crucial for SAF to prevent RSF from advancing toward central Sudan, and similarly to retain the possibility of attempting to retake Darfur. A similar hunger emergency to that of El Fasher is unfolding in South Kordofan, where RSF has sieges on Dilling and Kadugli cities and civilians are without access to food and basic supplies.

Key political developments took place in recent months. In August, al-Burhan reshuffled the military leadership to consolidate control over allied forces. This came just a week after he reportedly held a secret meeting with the US to discuss ending the war, though neither side has confirmed the meeting. The army-aligned government convened in Khartoum for the first time since the war began. 

At the same time, the de facto partition of the country was further solidified as the RSF leader Hemedti was sworn in as head of an RSF led government in Nyala, South Darfur.

As both sides consolidate control over different parts of Sudan, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and detentions have become more prominent. Both the SAF and RSF have reportedly abducted, tortured, and killed civilians accused of collaborating with the other side, often based on ethnic profiling or online activity. Many are held incommunicado where conditions are inhumane and torture is reported. Between January and June 2025, OHCHR verified at least 528 disappearances, including women and children as young as 12, however the real number is expected to be much higher with the Sudanese Group for Defending Rights and Freedoms estimating up to 50,000. Human rights defenders have faced targeted killings, arbitrary arrests, disappearances, harassment, and smear campaigns, while women defenders are especially vulnerable to sexual violence and politically motivated prosecutions carrying severe penalties. Those areas most affected have been East and South Darfur, Khartoum, Sennar, White Nile, and newly contested areas like Al Jazirah. Although RSF abuses appear more systematically reported, SAF has also been implicated in these practices. While such violations attract less public attention than combat deaths and massacres, they reflect a deliberate strategy by both sides to suppress dissent, erase rival influence, and terrorise the communities under their control.

Violence is likely to remain high throughout the dry season, which began in October, as past conflict patterns in Sudan show that dry seasons have consistently brought higher levels of violence and casualties, as improved mobility and more favorable conditions allow for larger campaigns.  The rainy season (June–September) temporarily limited ground offensives, though both sides intensified their use of drones and airstrikes. With the onset of the dry season drones are expected to be complemented by expanded ground operations. 

International response:

The international community condemned the ongoing violations in El Fasher. The United Nations, the African Union, regional blocs and prominent governments have issued statements urgently calling for safe passage and protection of civilians and calling for a ceasefire. However, more can and should be done. The UN Security Council was briefed on the issue, but failed to even make a consolidated presentation in response. The international community should take concrete and decisive steps to ensure the protection of civilians.

The African Commission of Human and People’s Rights Fact Finding Mission on the situation in Sudan released its reporthighlighting the ongoing situation. The report confirmed that serious and massive human rights violations are ongoing in Sudan, the violations documented could amount to crimes against humanity or war crimes. The report called for urgent action to protect civilians and end impunity. It urged the AU to deploy a peacekeeping mission to stabilise the area and secure safe humanitarian corridors, alongside the creation of an African-led accountability mechanism to prosecute grave human rights violations. It also stressed the need for a transitional justice process guided by the AU Transitional Justice Policy to address the root causes of the conflict and lay the foundation for lasting peace and reconciliation.

The Quad—comprising the U.S., Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Egypt—issued a statement laying out a roadmap for peace in Sudan, breathing new life into a peace process that had made little progress in the prior year. They emphasised that the conflict has no military solution and urged both sides to agree to a three-month humanitarian truce, paving the way for a permanent ceasefire and a nine-month transition toward an independent, civilian-led government. The statement drew support from the United Nations, the African Union and IGAD– both of which reaffirmed their commitment to working with the Quad; the GCC, the Tasis (RSF-led) government, and the “Steadfast” alliance, and others, but was rejected by both SAF and RSF. While this marks a positive step that could strengthen international engagement, its success depends on credible guarantees and genuine local ownership, without which it risks failing as happened with the previous agreements.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) convicted Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali Kushayb), a senior leader of the Janjaweed militia, of having committed crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur in 2003 and 2004. This represents the first conviction in the Darfur situation and the only situation to date referred to the court by the UN Security Council. 

The UN Security Council unanimously renewed the Sudan sanctions regime for another year through Resolution 2791 (2025), extending targeted sanctions, the arms embargo, and the mandate of the Panel of Experts until October 2026. The Council also held closed consultations on 1 October to discuss the humanitarian situation in North Darfur.